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4.1  Introduction 
Concern  over the  lack  of  portability  associated  with  employer-provided 
health  insurance has precipitated  a recent flurry of research  activity on the 
effects of health insurance on labor market outcomes. Several estimates sug- 
gest that the costs associated with changing doctors and losing coverage for 
preexisting conditions are sufficient to deter individuals from changing jobs. 
These costs may be particularly important for older individuals contemplating 
retirement because a departure from the labor force may involve not only a 
change in doctors or lack of coverage for preexisting conditions but a complete 
loss of access to employer-provided group health insurance. 
Although all individuals are eligible for government-provided group health 
insurance-Medicare-upon  reaching age 65, most individuals state a desire 
to retire before age 65 (Employee Benefit Research Institute 1990).  In contrast 
with social security, however, there is no early retirement age before 65 when 
individuals qualify for Medicare. For some, this is not an issue because their 
employers provide postretirement health insurance benefits. The majority of 
workers, however, are not entitled to such benefits because their employers do 
not offer them. It is these workers whom we would expect to be most con- 
cerned about how early retirement will affect their health insurance coverage. 
Understanding the role of health insurance in retirement decisions is impor- 
tant because the government is currently trying to encourage later retirement 
by  increasing the social security normal retirement age to 67 over the next 
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several years. There has been some talk about increasing the age of Medicare 
eligibility correspondingly.  Health care reform  that  makes health  insurance 
more portable from work to retirement may undermine this goal, however, if 
the potential loss or change in health insurance coverage that currently exists 
is a significant deterrent to retirement. 
While determining the effect of health insurance on retirement is important 
in its own right, properly accounting for the role of health insurance may also 
matter in accurately assessing the effects of other factors that have been more 
extensively studied. For example, previous research by  others has concluded 
that the financial incentives associated with pensions and social security ex- 
plain a significant fraction of observed retirement behavior; however, these two 
factors consistently underestimate the retirement that occurs at age 65. One 
explanation for this “excess” retirement is that individuals wait to retire until 
they are eligible for Medicare. Separating the effect of social security on retire- 
ment at age 65 from that of  Medicare is difficult, however, since eligibility 
for Medicare coincides with the social security normal retirement age of 65. 
Correctly modeling the role of  Medicare may therefore be important in as- 
sessing the effects of social security on retirement. 
Much of the emerging literature on health insurance and retirement has ex- 
amined the  impact of employer-provided retiree health insurance on retire- 
ment, concluding that such health insurance constitutes a significant induce- 
ment for early retirement. In contrast, there is little compelling evidence on the 
effect of Medicare. This paper considers the role of Medicare in the retirement 
decision and aims to present evidence on whether it, too, impacts this decision. 
4.2  The Relationship between Health Insurance and Retirement 
4.2.1  Evidence on the Relationship between Health Insurance 
and Retirement 
Table 4.1 summarizes the recent research that considers the relationship be- 
tween health insurance and retirement. These studies have used several differ- 
ent data sets and a variety of statistical approaches to estimate how health in- 
surance affects retirement. Five of the nine studies listed consider the effect of 
retiree  health  insurance  on retirement  (Madrian  1994; Headen,  Clark,  and 
Ghent  1995; Karoly  and  Rogowski  1994; Gustman  and  Steinmeier  1994a; 
Hurd and McGarry 1996).  Because such insurance enables individuals to leave 
the labor force while maintaining the same health insurance coverage available 
while working, it eliminates the cost associated with giving up one’s employer- 
provided  health insurance on retirement. All other things equal, individuals 
with access to retiree health insurance should thus be expected to retire earlier 
than individuals without access to such coverage. Indeed, using data from the 
Current Population  Survey (CPS), the National Medical Expenditure Survey 
(NMES), the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the Retire- Table 4.1  Estimates of the Effect of Health Insurance (HI) on Retirement 
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Table 4.1  (continued) 
Study  Data and Sample  Estimation  Results 
retirement age by 3.9 
months 
Lumsdaine,  Data: Proprietary firm  Structural model of age  Value of Medicare has 
Stock, and  administrative data  at retirement  little effect on age at 
Wise  Sample: Men and  HI variable: imputed  retirement 
(1994a)  women, initial  value of Medicare 
workers 
ment History Survey (RHS), and the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), 
all five of these studies estimate that retiree health insurance does encourage 
early retirement. 
Two of the studies assess whether continuation of coverage mandates, which 
allow individuals to maintain their employer-provided  health insurance for a 
limited period of time after retirement, have a similar impact on retirement 
(Gruber and Madrian 1995, 1996). Using data from the SIPP and the CPS, this 
research concludes that such mandates also encourage early retirement. 
Only two studies focus on the role of  Medicare in the retirement decision: 
Rust and Phelan (1997) and Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1994a). Using data 
from the RHS on men without pensions, Rust and Phelan find that individuals 
with employer-provided health insurance that does not continue past retirement 
are much less likely to retire than those who have other forms of health insur- 
ance (including retiree  health  insurance) or no health  insurance; this effect, 
however, is smaller after age 65, when these individuals become eligible for 
Medicare, than before. Overall, they conclude that Medicare explains almost 
all of  the excess spike in the retirement hazard  at age 65 after the  financial 
incentives associated with social security have been accounted for. 
Using  administrative  data from a single large employer, Lumsdaine et al. 
reach the opposite conclusion-that  Medicare has little effect on retirement. 
This result is surprising given the consistent results from the previously rnen- 
tioned studies suggesting that other forms of health insurance are important 
factors in deciding when to retire. It is difficult, however, to extend the conclu- 
sions in Lumsdaine et al. to the population  as a whole because the firm that 
employed all of the individuals in their data set provided postretirement health 
insurance benefits. With the opportunity to continue their employer-provided 
health insurance after retirement, it is not surprising that Medicare would not 
affect the retirement decisions of these particular individuals. 
4.2.2  The Role of Medicare in the Retirement Decision 
What role should Medicare play in the retirement decision? The answer de- 
pends on a variety of factors. While Medicare has several features that distin- 113  Does Medicare Eligibility Affect Retirement? 
guish it from the health insurance policies typically provided by employers or 
in the private market, there are three characteristics that are important in as- 
sessing its effect on retirement. The first is eligibility. All individuals, whether 
retired or not, are eligible for Medicare on reaching age 65. As mentioned 
earlier, although the age of Medicare eligibility corresponds to the social secu- 
rity normal retirement age, there is no corresponding early accessibility to 
Medicare if individuals choose to start receiving their social security benefits 
early, between the ages of 62 and 65 (although some individuals younger than 
65 may also receive Medicare coverage if they are eligible for disability ben- 
efits). 
A second feature distinguishing Medicare from many other insurance plans 
is that there are no exclusions for preexisting conditions; all medical conditions 
are covered from the first day of eligibility onward, whether or not individuals 
have previously sought treatment for these conditions. A third characteristic of 
Medicare that differentiates it from other forms of health insurance is that cov- 
erage is available only to individuals. There is no provision allowing for cover- 
age of  spouses, children, or other dependents of  individuals who are them- 
selves eligible for Medicare coverage. 
The interaction between these characteristics of the Medicare program and 
the availability of employer-provided health insurance for active employees as 
well as retirees implies that Medicare will have different effects on the retire- 
ment decisions of  individuals depending on their own health insurance and 
family situations. For individuals working in jobs that do not provide health 
insurance, there is no health insurance loss from early retirement. While these 
individuals may welcome Medicare coverage, it should not affect their retire- 
ment decisions; they will receive Medicare on turning 65 regardless of when 
they retire from their jobs. 
Similarly, individuals who work for employers that do provide health insur- 
ance for their active employees and who have the option of maintaining this 
health insurance when they retire should not have their retirement decisions 
affected  by  Medicare. Their  health  insurance  situation will  be  the  same 
whether or not they are retired, both before age 65, when they have access to 
employer-provided health insurance, and after, when they have access to both 
Medicare and employer-provided health insurance. 
The individuals who  should possibly have  their retirement decisions af- 
fected by  Medicare are those who have  employer-provided health insurance 
while  employed but  who do not  have  access to employer-provided retiree 
health insurance on retirement. For these individuals, retiring before age 65 
may involve a loss or change in health insurance coverage. To  the extent that 
losing one’s  employer-provided health insurance is costly, these individuals 
have an incentive to postpone retirement until age 65. If, however, these indi- 
viduals have dependents, then retirement, even at age 65,  will involve a loss of 
health insurance coverage for some members of the family. Such individuals 114  Brigitte C. Madrian and Nancy Dean Beaulieu 
Table 4.2  Health Insurance Coverage of Non-Medicare-Eligible 
Women (percent) 
Husband's Age 


























Source: Authors' calculations using data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey. 
may thus find it in their interest to further postpone retirement until their family 
members can be covered by other forms of health insurance. 
Table 4.2 illustrates the differences in the sources of health insurance cover- 
age for women not yet categorically eligible for Medicare stratified on the basis 
of whether their husbands are younger or older than age 65. Although non- 
Medicare-eligible wives of Medicare-eligible husbands are only slightly more 
likely to be uninsured than wives of  non-Medicare-eligible  husbands  ( 14.5 
percent vs.  12.0 percent), the sources of  their health insurance coverage are 
very different. They are much less likely to be covered by employer-provided 
group health insurance (52.1 percent vs. 74.5 percent) and much more likely to 
be covered by private nongroup health insurance (22.4 percent vs. 6.0 percent). 
These numbers  suggest that  a significant  fraction  of  women  lose access to 
employer-provided  group health insurance when their husbands retire. Many 
are able to substitute nongroup health insurance coverage. However, this may 
be quite costly (especially if individuals have preexisting conditions), and there 
are likely many women who would find themselves without health insurance 
except for the fact that their husbands continue to work after age 65 in order to 
maintain coverage for their wives. 
4.2.3 
The discussion above suggests that one possible identification strategy that 
could be used to estimate the effect of Medicare on retirement is to compare 
the retirement behavior of three groups of  individuals: (1) those whose em- 
ployers do not provide health  insurance, (2) those whose employers provide 
health insurance to both active employees and retirees, and (3) those whose 
employers provide health insurance to active employees but not to retirees. If 
maintaining health insurance coverage is valuable, then, all other things equal, 
those in the third group should be least likely to retire before age 65. If Medi- 
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care provides coverage that is as valued as employer-provided health insurance, 
then after age 65 there should be no difference in the likelihood of being retired 
for these three groups.’ 
There are two problems with empirically implementing this identification 
strategy. The first is that there are no currently available longitudinal data sets 
that allow us to observe the type of health insurance available to individuals 
before they retire and to subsequently track their retirement behavior.2 While 
the new HRS will make this type of analysis possible,  it will not be feasible 
until more waves of the data have been released. 
The second problem is that all other things are not equal for individuals in 
the three groups described above. In particular, firms that provide health insur- 
ance also tend to provide pensions, and pensions tend to have provisions that 
encourage retirement  at particular ages. Thus, using individuals whose em- 
ployers provide retiree health insurance as a “control” in assessing the retire- 
ment behavior of  individuals whose employers provide health  insurance but 
not retiree health insurance will not be valid unless it is possible to adequately 
account for the differential pension  incentives  that individuals in these two 
groups face. Once again, the HRS will allow for this type of analysis when 
sufficient waves of the data are available, but currently the only data sets with 
detailed pension information either come from a single firm (as used in several 
papers by Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise) or do not also include adequate infor- 
mation  on health  insurance (as is the case with the Survey of Consumer Fi- 
nances data used by Samwick, 1993). 
Rust and Phelan circumvent this latter problem by restricting their sample 
to individuals who report having no pension. The earlier discussion on how 
Medicare  should  affect  retirement  suggests  another  possible  identification 
strategy, however. Because Medicare is provided only to individuals and not to 
their dependents,  there will  still be  a health insurance cost associated with 
retiring at age 65 if  an individual has dependents who are covered by his or 
her employer-provided  health  insurance.  Thus,  we  can  determine  whether 
Medicare has an effect on retirement by comparing the retirement behavior of 
individuals with and without dependents who obtain health insurance from that 
individual’s employment. 
Because the majority of  individuals who provide health insurance to other 
1, In fact, Medicare is much less generous than the typical employer-provided health insurance 
policy. Thus,  there may still be some value in maintaining one’s employer-provided health insur- 
ance even after becoming eligible for Medicare. 
2. The RHS does include some information on health insurance coverage. Rust and Phelan 
(1994) and Gustman and Steinmeier (1994a) have used these data to infer what type of health 
insurance coverage was available to individuals before they retired. Gustman and Steinmeier, how- 
ever, have substantially lower health insurance coverage rates than found in data sets typically 
cited as sources of health insurance coverage such as the NMES or the SIPP. In contrast, Rust and 
Phelan have coverage rates than are substantially higher for their subset of the population than is 
found in these other sources. Thus, the health insurance data in the RHS appear to be somewhat un- 
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family members are men, this paper focuses on the retirement behavior of men. 
Although  some older men nearing the age of retirement still have dependent 
children at home, most do not. The majority, however, are married. The identi- 
fication strategy used in this paper will be to compare the retirement behavior 
of men who have spouses older than age 65 and are thus already eligible for 
Medicare with the retirement behavior of men whose spouses are not yet eligi- 
ble for Medicare. 
Consider a simple specification for the retirement hazard of  an individual 
covered by employer-provided health insurance that does not continue into re- 
tirement: 
Pr (RetireiNot retired,-,)  = a  (Demographic characteristics) 
+  p (Own financial incentives) 
+ y (Spouse’ s financial incentives)  + E 
(1) 
The function a(.)  may contain such factors as age, health status, marital status, 
education, and other things that would affect the value of leisure. The function 
p(*)  includes financial variables that directly affect one’s retirement: 
(2)  p,. (  Social)  (Private)  (Medicare)  (Other) 
security 
+
 p2’ pension 
+
 p3’ eligibility 
+
  p4’  wealth  ‘ 
p(-)  could also include other factors such as an individual’s earning capacity. 
Recent research  suggests that both  the level of pension  and  social security 
wealth and expected future accruals affect retirement. The function y(  a)  would 
include a similar vector of variables for the individual’s spouse that may also 
impact the individual’s retirement decision: the social security and pension in- 
centives that encourage one spouse to retire at a particular age may also provide 
liquidity that enables the other spouse to retire as well; similarly, whether a 
spouse is eligible for Medicare will affect the amount of  wealth that can be 
used to finance nonhealth consumption during retirement in the same way that 
an individual’s own Medicare eligibility does. 
Because Medicare eligibility coincides with the social security normal re- 
tirement age for most individuals, and with the normal retirement age of many 
private  pension  plans, it is difficult  to separately identify p,,  p2, and  p,  in 
equation (2)  above. Similarly, if a spouse has worked and also qualifies for a 
pension or social security  in her own right, it will be difficult to separately 
identify y,, y2,  and y3.  There is, however, a nontrivial fraction of older women 
who  have never  participated  in  the  labor  force.  For men  married  to  these 
women, there are no financial benefits associated with a wife’s retirement that 
would also encourage their own retirement. If a woman has never worked, she 
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she can only do so after her husband begins to claim benefits himself. In this 
case, y, = yz = 0 and the effect of a spouse’s Medicare eligibility, y3, can 
be identified. 
If  men  value  health  insurance  coverage  of  themselves  and  their  wives 
equally, then y,  = p, and the effect of own Medicare eligibility is identified as 
well. If men value their own health insurance coverage more than that of their 
wives, then y3  will provide a lower bound on the effect of own Medicare eligi- 
bility on retirement. 
Note that this identification strategy is essentially based on the spouse’s age 
since, with the exception  of  those with disabilities, eligibility for Medicare 
occurs at age 65. Thus, all other things equal, retirement rates should be higher 
among men with wives who are age 65 or older than among men with wives 
who are younger than 65. 
4.3  Data 
We use data from the 5 percent public use samples of the  1980 and  1990 
censuses. The primary advantage of census data is that they afford a large sam- 
ple size. This is particularly important given the identification strategy outlined 
above based on whether a spouse is eligible for Medicare. Figure 4.1 shows 
the distribution of the differences between husband’s age and wife’s age in the 
census. Over half of the men in figure 4.1 have spouses who are the same age 
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Fig. 4.1 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 5 percent public use samples from the  1980 and  1990 
censuses. 
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tion of  spouse’s age relative to own age is so compressed, a big data set like 
the census allows us to exploit a broader range of  variation in spouse’s age. 
The disadvantage of  the census is that it includes no information on health 
insurance coverage. It is therefore impossible to compare the retirement proba- 
bilities of those with and without health insurance in order to see whether, as 
predicted, the effect of Medicare on retirement is confined to those who actu- 
ally did have employer-provided health insurance before retirement. This, how- 
ever, should bias us against finding an effect of Medicare on retirement since 
we will essentially be estimating the average of no effect among those without 
employer-provided health insurance or with retiree health insurance and what- 
ever effect may exist for those with employer-provided health insurance. 
The census also does not contain information on pension benefits  or ex- 
pected social security benefits. Rather than impute the values of these variables 
for individuals, we exclude them from the estimation and assume that spouse’s 
age is uncorrelated with these factors which, by exclusion, become a part of 
the error term, E. To us, this does not seem like an unreasonable assumption. 
We find it unlikely that men who married in their 20s and 30s chose a spouse 
of a specified age based on their tastes for retirement. It is more likely the case 
that divorce and later remarriage could be correlated with tastes for retirement 
or other unobserved factors such as pension benefits. For example, men with 
extremely generous pension benefits may be more likely to attract “trophy” 
spouses. We will assume, however, that these effects are small. 
Spouse’s age may, however, be correlated with who is in the sample. In par- 
ticular, retirement-aged men who had at one time married women much older 
than themselves will be more likely to be widowers because their spouses are 
already deceased. These men will thus be excluded from the sample (divorce 
will cause a similar type of sample selection problem). This exclusion will be 
on the basis of spouse’s age. As long as the assumption that spouse’s age is 
exogenous is valid, however, this will merely result in a thinning of the sample 
for men with older wives. The estimates will be less precise, but they will not 
be biased. 
The sample is restricted to married men with a spouse in the data set. We 
further restrict the sample to men whose wives are no more than 15 years older 
or 20 years younger than themselves. The restriction is imposed because, be- 
yond this range, the cell sizes are quite small and we do not want the estimation 
to be driven by a few outliers. Overall, our census sample includes approxi- 
mately 800,000 individuals. Summary statistics on these individuals are pre- 
sented in table 4.3. 
The definition of retiring in the last year is being currently out of the labor 
force but having worked one or more weeks in the previous calendar year.  In 
the census, “the  last year” represents  a  16-month window  since the census 
is conducted in April and the work question is asked about the previous calen- 
dar year. Using this definition,  14.4 percent of our sample retired in the last 
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Table 4.3  Summary Statistics 
Statistic  Value 





Less than high school 
High school graduate 
Some college 
College graduate 
Retired in last year (if worked last year) 
Age 
Age of wife 











Source: Authors’ tabulations using data from the 5 percent public use samples of  the  1980 and 
1990 censuses. Sample is all married men aged 55-69  who worked at least one week in the previ- 
ous calendar year and whose spouses are not more than 15 years older or 20 years younger than 
themselves. 
4.4  Estimating the Effect of Medicare on the Probability of 
Being Retired 
4.4.1  Basic Results 
We begin in table 4.4 by  simply tabulating the retirement hazards for men 
whose wives are not Medicare eligible (wife’s age < 65) and for those whose 
wives are Medicare eligible (wife’s age 2 65). The smallest cell size is 654 for 
individuals who are age 55 and have a wife older than age 65. These estimates, 
therefore, are fairly reliable. As would be expected, the retirement hazard is 
small for men still in their 50s and increases quite substantially at ages 62 and 
65. The typical spikes in the retirement hazard at ages 62 and 65 are not as 
pronounced in the census data because the definition of retirement is one that 
occurred within the past 16  months and the age in the table is current age rather 
than age at the start of  this  16-month period. Thus, the retirement hazard of 
individuals initially  aged 61 will be spread out over 62- and 63-year-olds  in 
the table. 
The retirement hazards in table 4.4 are, as we would predict, higher at all 
ages for those whose wives are eligible for Medicare. The absolute percentage 
point differential between these two hazards (the last column) appears roughly 
constant at about 3 or 4 percentage points. Although these results are sugges- 
tive that Medicare eligibility does encourage retirement, one could expect sim- 
ilar results  for other reasons. For example, if  women face greater financial 
incentives to retire at older ages and these financial rewards also make it easier 
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Table 4.4  Retirement Hazard by  Age and Wife’s Medicare Eligibility 
Wife’s Age 
Below 65  65 or Older  Difference 





























































Source: Authors’ tabulations using data from the 5 percent public use samples of  the 1980 and 
1990 censuses. Sample is all married men aged 55-69  who worked at least one week in the previ- 
ous calendar year and whose spouses are not more than 15 years older or 20 years younger than 
themselves. 
will be more likely to retire. Alternatively, men may value their own leisure 
time more if  their wives are retired, and this too will make husbands more 
likely  to retire if their wives  are older and more likely  to be  retired  (for a 
discussion of joint retirement issues, see Hurd 1990; Gustman and Steinmeier 
1994b; Blau 1994, 1995). Or, to the extent that continued work competes with 
the amount of time that men can spend with their wives before the health prob- 
lems incumbent with age set in, men with older wives will be more likely to 
retire than men with younger wives. By stratifying the sample on the basis of 
whether wife’s age is greater or less than 65, one would find a pattern of results 
similar to those in table 4.4 even if it were not Medicare eligibility per se but 
one of these other reasons that also implied that having an older spouse leads 
to earlier retirement. 
One way to gauge the importance of these alternative explanations is to look 
at the pattern  of  retirement rates associated with spouse’s age. Consider the 
following general specification for a retirement hazard that incorporates all 
three of the above explanations: 
(3)  Pr(Retire,lNot retired,-,)  = {z:s)  + ~~pouse  working  not) 
+
-
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A spouse’s  ineligibility for Medicare will operate through the a(*)  function 
above, affecting the retirement hazard by  decreasing the present discounted 
value (PDV) of assets that can be used to finance nonhealth consumption, If 
the discount rate is positive and the relationship between assets and retirement 
is linear, then, conditional on own age, the effect of spouse’s age on the retire- 
ment hazard will be as pictured in figure 4.2A. Before the spouse reaches age 
65, the retirement hazard should decline as the spouse is younger and has suc- 
cessively more years before becoming eligible for Medicare. The rate of de- 
A:  Medicare and the Retirement Hazard 
0.6 1 
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65 
Age of Wife 
B: Joint Retirement and the Retirement Hazard 
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C:  Spouse’s Health and the Retirement Hazard 
0.6  I 
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Age of wife 
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cline should slow, however, as expected medical and/or insurance expenditures 
in the future are discounted. After the spouse is 65, however, there is no further 
health insurance cost in terms of leaving the spouse without employer-provided 
health insurance; thus, the hazard rate should not change with spouse's  age 
after the spouse reaches age 65. 
Joint retirement considerations will affect the retirement hazard through the 
p(*)  function in equation (3). If they are the primary force behind the retire- 
ment hazard's increasing with spouse's age, we should see a steady increase in 
retirement probabilities as the spouse gets older and is herself more likely to 
retire. We might expect to see especially large increases as the spouse reaches 
ages 62 and 65 and faces the incentives  associated with social security that 
increase the retirement hazard at these ages (see fig. 4.2B). To the extent that 
most women have already retired by age 65, the joint retirement hypothesis 
would not be inconsistent with a constant hazard after the spouse has reached 
age 65; if there are continued incentives for women to retire after age 65, how- 
ever, and enough women are still working at this age, then the joint retirement 
explanation should be associated with increasing retirement hazards with re- 
spect to spouse's age even after the spouse is age 65. 
Finally, the y(-)  function in equation (3) characterizes the effect of spouse's 
health on retirement. If it is spouse's health that is driving the results in table 
4.4, then the retirement hazard  should be increasing at an increasing rate in 
spouse's age, as shown in figure 4.2C, as health becomes progressively worse 
(and mortality more likely) with age. 
To  examine which of these alternatives appear to be borne out in the data, 
figure 4.3 graphs the retirement hazards of men  at various  ages against the 
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differences between their ages and their spouses’ ages (the ages shown in fig. 
4.3 are 60, 62, 65, and 67).3  The circles in the graph give the actual retirement 
rates calculated from the 1980 and 1990 censuses for each age difference. The 
vertical line gives the age at which the wife becomes eligible for Medicare; 
thus, this line shifts to the right as the age considered in the graph increases. 
The line drawn through the circles in the graph is a nonparametric weighted 
smoothed mean (with bandwidth = 0.7).  This smoothing was done to decrease 
the noise in the retirement rates in the tails of the age difference distribution. 
The graphs for ages 60,62, and 65 show a pattern not inconsistent with that 
in figure 4.2A: roughly constant for spouses older than 65 and decreasing at a 
decreasing rate with spouse’s age less than 65. None of the graphs gives any 
suggestion of the retirement pattern in figure 4.2C that would prevail if spousal 
health  concerns  were  a  predominant  consideration  in  retirement  decisions. 
None of  the graphs is completely inconsistent with the joint retirement hy- 
pothesis. 
We can parameterize the patterns shown in figure 4.3 with the following re- 
gression: 
Pr(Retire  I  Not retired,+,) =  p,  . Age + p,  -  Age 
* [ln(65 - Wife’s Age)I Wife  < 651 
~  __ 
(4)  ~, 
+ p,  . Age * (Wife  2 65) + p,  . Age 
* (Wife’s Age - 65). 
~  ~ 
In this regression, As  is a vector of age dummies and the coefficient vector 
p, will give a baseline retirement hazard for each age. The second term, [ln(65 
-  Wife’s Age)  I  Wife <  651, equals zero if wife’s age is 65 or older and equals 
the log of (65 -  Wife’s Age) if wife’s age is less than 65. This term is meant to 
capture the decreasing retirement hazard with respect to wife’s age for wives 
younger than 65 shown in figure 4.2A. The third term is a dummy variable for 
whether or not wife’s age is 65 or older. Finally, the fourth term is the preceding 
dummy variable interacted with the difference between wife’s age and age 65 
for Medicare-eligible  women. The coefficient p,  will thus measure whether 
there is any slope in the retirement hazard with respect to wife’s age for men 
with wives older than 65. Note that the last three terms in equation (4) are all 
interacted with the vector of age dummies so that each variable will be associ- 
ated with a vector of coefficients for each age between 55 and 69. 
Table 4.5 presents the coefficients from estimating equation (4) using ordi- 
nary least squares. The regression  coefficients  tell  a story similar to that of 
figure 4.3. The vector of  constant terms, p,, increases with age and exhibits 
the familiar spikes at both age 62 and age 65. The p,  coefficients are all nega- 
3. Note that these are not mutually exclusive arguments for why men with older wives are more 
likely to he retired. Indeed, there are men who probably make retirement decisions for all of the 
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Table 4.5  Effect of Spouse’s Age and Medicare Eligibility on Retirement 
Independent Variable 
ln(65 -  Wife’s Age)  Wife’s Age -  65 
Constant  if Wife < 65  Wife 2 65  if Wife 2 65 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the 5 percent public use samples of the 1980 and 
1990 censuses. Sample is all married men aged 55-69  who worked at least one week in the previ- 
ous calendar year and whose spouses are not more than 15 years older or 20 years younger than 
themselves. The sample size is 799,069, and the R2 = 0.219. 
tive and significant (with t-statistics ranging from 2.6 to 14.4) and increase in 
magnitude with own age from roughly -.010  for ages less than 60 to -.030 
for ages greater than 65. These coefficients confirm the hypothesis that at all 
ages men with wives not yet eligible for Medicare are less likely to retire the 
younger are their spouses. We might also expect the magnitude of the coeffi- 
cients to increase with age as spouse’s lack of Medicare eligibility should have 
a greater absolute effect on the retirement hazard for men who themselves have 125  Does Medicare Eligibility Affect Retirement? 
a greater likelihood of retiring. The p,  and p,  coefficients in table 4.5 show no 
strong patterns, change in sign, and are generally insignificant  (only 6 of the 
30 coefficients have t-statistics exceeding 2 in magnitude). These results sug- 
gest that the retirement hazard is roughly constant with respect to wife’s age 
once the wife is 65 or older and eligible for Medicare. 
4.4.2  Alternative Explanations 
Although the lack of a slope in the retirement hazard with respect to spouse’s 
age greater than 65 is consistent with Medicare eligibility’s playing an impor- 
tant role in retirement  decisions, it is not, as mentioned earlier, completely 
inconsistent with a joint retirement story. This explanation for the patterns in 
the retirement hazard, however, relies on the premise that the wife is or at one 
time was working. If the effects presented in table 4.5 derive only from the 
financial rewards associated with the wife’s collection of social security and/or 
pension benefits before age 65 or other joint retirement considerations, they 
should be confined to those men who have wives who have a history of labor 
force participation and there should be no effect among men whose wives have 
never worked. That is, in the specification of the retirement hazard in equation 
(4), the function p(.) will have no differential impact by spouse’s age. 
Because the census collects data on work history, this comparison is pos- 
sible. Fortunately, a large enough fraction of the cohorts of men aged 55-69  in 
1980 and 1990 had wives who reported never having worked (about 8 percent), 
so the comparison is feasible as well. Table 4.6 gives the retirement hazards 
shown in table 4.4 for the subsample of men whose wives never worked. As 
before, the hazards for those with spouses older than 65 tend to be greater than 
the hazards for those with spouses younger than 65. The wife older than 65 
hazard  and the differential (last column) is somewhat more noisy for those 
whose  spouses  have  never  worked  because  this  stratification  breaks  even 
the census into somewhat small cell sizes for those at young ages who have 
Medicare-eligible spouses. For the older ages, however, the results suggest that 
even among those who have never worked, having a Medicare-eligible spouse 
increases the retirement hazard. The differential is on average smaller for those 
whose spouses have never worked than for those whose spouses have worked, 
suggesting that some of the effects in table 4.4 can perhaps be attributed to 
joint retirement or other considerations associated with having a spouse older 
than oneself. 
Table 4.7 presents the regression coefficients of table 4.5 for the subsample 
of men whose wives never worked. The baseline retirement rate, p,, is slightly 
higher for this subsample of men than for the full sample. The effect of having 
a spouse not yet eligible for Medicare (p,)  is, as in table 4.5, always negative, 
although at younger ages the coefficients are not significant. This is due in part 
to a significantly smaller sample, and to the fact that the coefficient estimates 
bounce around a little more. The overall pattern of coefficients,  however, is 
very similar to that in table 4.5-increasing  and becoming more significant 126  Brigitte C. Madrian and Nancy Dean Beaulieu 































































Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the 5 percent public use samples of  the 1980 and 
1990 censuses and the 1980-94 March Current Population Survey. Sample is all married men aged 
55-69  who worked at least one week in the previous calendar year and whose spouses are not 
more than 15 years older or 20 years younger than themselves. 
with age. Similarly, the vectors of  p, and p,  coefficients are also similar to 
those in table 4.5: they jump around in magnitude, they change sign, and they 
are generally insignificant.  Restricting the sample to men whose wives have 
never worked thus yields results very similar to those obtained from the full 
sample of men. 
4.5  Conclusions 
While we hesitate to draw strong conclusions about the effect of Medicare 
eligibility on retirement behavior because the census data used in the analysis 
are less than ideal, we think that the results presented in the paper are sugges- 
tive that Medicare may indeed influence the retirement decisions of men. Our 
main findings are as follows: (1) 55-69-year-old  men with Medicare-eligible 
spouses have a higher retirement hazard than men without Medicare-eligible 
spouses. (2)  The retirement hazard exhibits a pattern with respect to spouse’s 
age that is consistent with what would be expected if Medicare were an  impor- 
tant consideration in the retirement decision. It is inconsistent with a story that 
other factors more generally related to spouse’s age, such as a spouse’s health 
status, are strong determinants of retirement as the retirement hazard appears 
to be roughly constant after the spouse reaches age 65 rather than generally 127  Does Medicare Eligibility Affect Retirement? 
Table 4.7  Effect of Spouse’s  Age and Medicare Eligibility on Retirement if 
Spouse Never Worked 
Independent Variable 
ln(65 -  Wife’s Age)  Wife’s Age -  65 
Constant  if Wife < 65  Wife 2 65  if Wife 2 65 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the 5 percent public use samples of the 1980 and 
1990 censuses. Sample is all married men aged 55-69  who worked at least one week in the previ- 
ous calendar year and whose spouses are not more than  15 years older or 20 years younger than 
themselves. The sample size equals 59,731 and R2 = 0.263. 
increasing. (3) The pattern  of  effects is approximately  the  same when  the 
sample is confined to men whose wives have never worked. This latter group 
of men cannot be affected by any financial considerations inducing their wives 
to retire. Furthermore, having a nonworking spouse cannot differentially im- 
pact the retirement hazard with respect to spouse’s age of this group because 
their wives have never worked. The most plausible explanation for the pattern 128  Brigitte C. Madrian and Nancy Dean Beaulieu 
of  retirement effects exhibited by this latter group is the Medicare eligibility 
of their wives. Because the effects are similar for the whole population of men 
regardless of spouse’s work history, it is likely that Medicare is also an impor- 
tant determinant of retirement for all men. 
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Comment  James H. Stock 
This paper addresses a question at the intersection of  two important areas of 
economic and policy research, the economic effects of health insurance and 
the retirement behavior of  older workers. Because health care use increases 
with age, it makes sense that the particulars of a worker’s health care situation 
will have a substantial impact on his or her retirement decisions. Moreover, 
to the extent that Medicare eligibility affects the timing of retirement, policy 
proposals that would change the age of  Medicare eligibility could have  sig- 
nificant effects on the ages of retirement. Quantifying these interactions is of 
evident importance both to those interested the economics of  aging and to 
Medicare policy analysts. 
Before proceeding to the particulars of Madrian and Beaulieu’s empirical 
analysis, it is useful to lay  out the central economic issues of  the effect of 
Medicare on retirement. As discussed by  Madrian and Beaulieu, there is now 
a well-developed literature on the retirement behavior of individuals. It is well 
established that economic incentives have significant and, importantly, predict- 
able effects on retirement rates. For example, defined benefit plans typically 
induce spikes in retirement hazards at ages of eligibility and at ages in which 
the  present  value  of  benefits  increase  sharply. Because Medicare  can  be 
thought of  as another retirement benefit, in light of this literature it would be 
quite surprising were Medicare eligibility not to have an effect on retirement. 
Rather, the relevant economic and policy question is whether Medicare is val- 
ued by potential retirees at more than its marginal cost to the government, or at 
more than its private replacement cost were retirees instead to purchase health 
insurance on the private market. This is not implausible if individuals are risk 
averse about changing medical coverage or if they are unable to obtain suitable 
coverage because of exclusions on preexisting conditions. If a dollar of govern- 
ment spending on Medicare is valued more on the margin than a dollar of 
government spending on social security, then it would be welfare improving to 
reduce social security expenditures and increase Medicare expenditures. 
Results already in the literature can be used to obtain a rough estimate of 
the effect of Medicare on retirement rates at age 65. Consider a couple with 
employer-provided health insurance, and suppose that private insurance for the 
couple costs $6,500 in 1995 dollars. If the couple values Medicare at this pri- 
vate replacement cost, then the availability of Medicare corresponds to an ac- 
crual of retirement benefits of  $6,500 when the couple becomes eligible for 
Medicare. Although the estimates of the effects of a $6,500 accrual on retire- 
ment differ depending on the couple’s other benefits and on the model used, 
a typical estimate can be obtained from the retirement models in table 4 of 
James H. Stock is professor of political economy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University, a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, a fellow 
of the Econometric Society, and chair of the board of editors of  the Review ofEconomics and Sfu- 
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Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1993), which predicts an increase in the retire- 
ment hazard by between 3 and 6 percentage points. This corresponds to ap- 
proximately one-fifth to one-third of the jump in retirement hazards observed 
at age 65, depending on the data set. One question thus is whether Medicare 
eligibility in fact produces an increase in retirement rates greater than those 
predicted by current structural models of retirement. If so, this would be evi- 
dence either that the models are misspecified or that individuals value Medi- 
care at more than its private replacement cost. 
With these general remarks in mind, now turn to the particulars of Madrian 
and  Beaulieu’s  paper.  In  contrast  to  the  parametric,  structural  model  ap- 
proaches pursued by most papers on retirement, Madrian and Beaulieu take a 
more nonparametric approach. The thought experiment is to find two otherwise 
identical couples, one who will bear costs of medical insurance and one who 
will be eligible for some Medicare coverage. To implement this strategy empir- 
ically, one would  like to have data on pensions,  wages, and social security 
benefits, by individual. However, these variables are not observed in Madrian 
and Beaulieu’s data set, so additional assumptions are needed to identify the 
effect of Medicare. 
To  examine the identification  strategy more precisely, it is useful to refer 
to the authors’ initial equation linking the retirement hazard to demographic 
characteristics, the man’s financial incentives, his spouse’s financial incentives, 
and other determinants (the error term). As Madrian and Beaulieu point out, if 
the  spouse has never worked,  then  the spouse’s financial incentives  will  be 
restricted to Medicare, which is strictly linked to her age. Present value calcu- 
lations suggest a particular functional form for the effect on the man’s retire- 
ment of this benefit as a function of spouse’s age. If, furthermore, the difference 
between husband’s age and spouse’s age is uncorrelated with any of the man’s 
(unmeasured) financial incentives, then estimation of hazard functions involv- 
ing this spouse’s age effect should reveal the effect of Medicare. 
This is a clever idea, and surely some of what it measures is related to the 
effect of Medicare. One unmeasurable effect is, however, the benefits a couple 
would get from joint retirement, both financial (possibly some cost reductions, 
or from moving) and, arguably more important, nonfinancial. It stands to rea- 
son that, all else equal, the older the spouse the more likely the husband is to 
choose retirement, simply so the couple can enjoy their retirement together. 
Presumably this  effect  is also nonlinear in both  of their ages, although the 
precise form of the nonlinearity is presumably hard to determine. 
It is useful to contemplate a hypothetical data structure that would permit 
controlling for this joint retirement effect. One would be if some spouses were 
randomly  assigned to be  Medicare  eligible,  while  some spouses were  ran- 
domly denied eligibility; this random assignment would need to be done far 
enough in advance for the couple to incorporate it into their retirement plan- 
ning. Thinking of this approach makes it clear that Medicare eligibility has 
two effects: the direct subsidy at a certain age, but also the disincentive effect 131  Does Medicare Eligibility Affect Retirement? 
on savings, so that in a world without Medicare individuals would have differ- 
ent preretirement  asset profiles. Both these effects will impact the decision 
to retire. 
In summary, Madrian and Beaulieu’s idea of quantifying the effect of Medi- 
care eligibility using  nonparametric comparisons is appealing, and the evi- 
dence they  present  is  consistent  with  the  view  that  Medicare  provides  a 
significant incentive for retirement. Some of the challenges to achieving identi- 
fication arise from data limitations in the census, and these will be reduced 
with new data sets with greater information about retirement decisions that 
will soon become available. However, some of these difficulties are inherent in 
the nonfinancial issues surrounding joint retirement. 
The set of issues surrounding health insurance and retirement are of central 
importance for analyzing the impact of current policy proposals such as post- 
poning the date of Medicare eligibility and cutting back Medicare andor  social 
security funding. Related is whether individuals value the marginal Medicare 
expenditure at more than it costs the government to provide, in which case a 
dollar taken out of  social security would arguably be more acceptable to the 
elderly than a dollar taken out of Medicare, all else equal. I look forward to 
seeing further work by Madrian and Beaulieu and others addressing these im- 
port  ant problems , 
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